The relatively recent rise to prominence of the Hamas organisation in the Arab-Israeli conflict has had a marked affect on the social and economic deterioration which characterises the present-day Gaza Conflict. Until 2000, the chief non-state actor against Israel had been the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Following the breakdown of the 1990s Oslo peace accords however, two new organisations - Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza - replaced the PLO as the dominant forces fighting Israel.
The rise of Hamas produced an unprecedented split with Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO. Initially this division was organisational and ideological but later became territorial as well. Indeed, the split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza exceeds anything in the history of Palestinian nationalism and is widely regarded as a continuing threat to the cohesion of the Palestinian movement and prospects of negotiations with Israel.
Hamas: Origins and philosophy
Members of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigades, Hamas’s military wing.
The modern Hamas organization - derived from Egypt’s Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood- was founded in 1987 by Sheik Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi and Mohammad Taha from the Palestinian wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It was thought of as an uprising against the Israeli rule (the name literally translates to "Islamic Resistance Movement"). The creation of Hamas’s military branch, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, followed in 1992.[1] The Brigades are currently classified as a terrorist organisation by Australia,[2] the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Israel declared Hamas itself an “illegal organization” in September 1989[3] and a “terrorist organization” in 2007.[4] Yassim played an integral role in forming the Hamas Charter, which sets forth the basic philosophy and goals of the organisation. The Charter states that the land in dispute is promised to Muslims.[5] Reclaiming Palestine in Hamas’s view must involve violence; negotiations are seen as impermissible because they will leave Jews with autonomy over some of Palestine.
In this way, Hamas reverted to the original 1968 Charter of the PLO, which had also called for Israel’s destruction. However, Hamas departed from PLO secularism in its embrace of militant Islam and unabashed anti-Semitism: “When an enemy usurps a Muslim land, then jihad is an individual religious duty on every Muslim”.[6] Hamas is committed to replacing Israel with a Palestinian Islamic state, all the while refusing to recognise Israel’s right to exist.[7] To many Palestinians, this continues to be far more emotionally appealing than Fatah's interest in negotiations.[8]
Build-up to the Gaza fighting of 2008-2009
In the latter part of 2001 local Hamas militants in Gaza began firing rockets into Israel as part of the second intifada. These activities intensified significantly during 2004 and 2005. When Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, it was hoped by Israel and others that the removal of settlers and soldiers from the area would reduce the motivation for further attacks. However, the Palestinian Authority (PA), to which control of Gaza was turned over, was even less effective than the Israeli security forces in suppressing rocket fire. It was unclear that the PA, even if it had the ability to do so, had a political interest in cracking down on the Hamas militants, in light of Hamas’s immense popularity among the Palestinians of Gaza.[9]
Hamas saw no reason to halt attacks just because Israel had withdrawn from Gaza. Moreover, Israeli withdrawal was more rhetoric than reality: Israel continued to control all air, sea and land approaches to Gaza, as well as its city and water supplies. Hamas insisted that Israel needed to cede this control if Gaza were to be truly independent, and declared its objective to liberate the whole of Gaza and the West Bank.
2006 Palestinian Elections
The Palestinian parliamentary elections in early 2006 saw the transfer of PA government control from Fatah to Hamas. This had severe consequences for, among other things, the Gazan economy. Upon Hamas’s electoral victory, the Israeli government decided it would not transfer the tax revenues that had been collected from the PA.[10] In addition, the US, UK and Israel demanded Hamas renounce violence and recognise Israel. When Hamas refused these demands, the US, Europe and Israel cut off all funding to the Palestinians and refused to recognise it as a legitimate government.[11]
The cut-off of financial aid to the Palestinians only served to increase Hamas’s bitterness. The West was seen by Hamas members and adherents as seeking to penalise the Palestinians for their legitimate democratic choice. Throughout 2006 and 2007 attacks on Israel by Hamas operatives and those of other Palestinian organisations in Gaza intensified. The sustained barrage of rockets fired from Gaza was justified by Hamas through arguing that Gazan civilians had routinely been the victims of Israeli attacks.
Hamas's takeover of Gaza: 2007
In early 2007, attempts were made to form a Palestinian unity government including members of both Hamas and Fatah. These efforts were aimed at making the government a more acceptable negotiating partner with both Israel and other states, as well as ending the antagonism between Fatah leaders in the West Bank and Hamas leaders in Gaza. Approved by the Palestinian parliament on March 17, 2007, the unity government collapsed in June that year when Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip.[12] At the same time as it governed in Gaza, Hamas refused to recognise the authority of the Fatah in the West Bank, resulting in a bitter divide between two separate Palestinian authorities.
Economic blockade
Violence emanating from Gaza continued to escalate rapidly until mid-January 2008, when Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak discontinued all imports into the Gaza Strip and increased Israeli military activity in the region. This effort to convince Hamas to end its attacks had limited success however, and conditions on the Gaza-Israel border continued to deteriorate as bitterness increased on both sides, making a negotiated settlement seem evermore unlikely. Israel eased its siege of Gaza on Jan 22 2008. However, following Hamas’s destruction of a portion of the fence between the Gaza Strip and Egypt the following day, Israel decided in early February to again tighten economic sanctions and step up military operations in the region.[13]
Gaza Fighting 2008-2009
Israeli soldiers returning from the war in Gaza, near the Israeli town of Sderot, January 18, 2009
The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) declared Hamas a significant and increasing threat in the Gaza Strip in April 2008. In June 2008 Israel and Hamas reached a six-month truce which mandated that Hamas end its attacks against Israel and that Israel discontinue its economic blockade of Gaza.[14] The truce failed to achieve complete adherence by either of the parties, and in December 2008 conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza escalated into full-fledged warfare.[15] Lasting over three weeks, what came be known as Operation Cast Lead began with a massive Israeli air strike against Hamas across Gaza and also came to involve a systematic ground campaign by the IDF.[16] Compared to the operations of the Gaza Division of the IDF, Hamas’s explosives were of limited effect; the IDF were able to kill and capture hundreds of fighters and it extended its control over an increasing portion of the Gaza Strip.[17] The Israeli cabinet declared a ceasefire in Gaza on 18 January 2009 and had completed withdrawal of forces by 21 January 2009.[18]
Assessing the events of 2008-2009: Hamas and conditions in Gaza
Disproportion in raw power meant that the ultimate advantage remained with the conventional army - the IDF. There was little Hamas could do to prevent the Israeli Air Force from engaging in the destruction of Gaza infrastructure. According to Palestinians and rights groups, more than 1400 Gazans were killed in the conflict, while according to Israel this number was 1166. Thirteen Israelis were killed.[19]
A Palestinian looking at the ruins of the al-Fadilahmosque,destroyed during an Israeli air strike on Rafah, in southernGaza,January 11, 2009
The IDF’s campaign against Hamas has been described as “an impressive victory.”[20] Nevertheless, through its uncompromising hostility to Israel, Hamas remains deeply popular with Palestinians, especially those in Gaza. Fatah continues to be regarded by many Palestinians as corrupt and out of touch, and its reliance on Israel has served to reduce its nationalist credentials in the eyes of a large proportion of the Palestinian population. Khaled Meshaal - the most prominent leader of Hamas today - has been quoted as declaring, "We're the root; Fatah is a mere branch."[21]
The economic blockade against Gaza remains in force, and is today supported by Egypt which, as part of its desire to reduce the influence of Iran in the Mid-East, seeks to put pressure on Hamas to reduce its ties with Iran. The US, Israel and Europe continue to refuse to finance Hamas until it recognises Israel. The economy of Gaza is therefore wrecked. There is little trade going on, and virtually no factories operating. Half of the population depends on food assistance from the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees,[22] and education and healthcare systems are in a state of disintegration.[23]
Hamas and the Peace Process
Khaled Meshaal, political chief of Hamas.
Opinion as to Hamas's precise role in seeking a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Mid-East remains divided. Michael Herzog, Brigadier General in the IDF, argues that Hamas, as the 'spoiler' in the process, should play no role in negotiations and moves towards a peace settlement.[24] Israel has ruled out Hamas as a legitimate negotiating party, the reasons for which have been declared to include Hamas's refusal to recognise Israel's right to exist, its unwillingness to compromise and its violent, undemocratic methods.[25]
On the other hand, continued widespread Palestinian support for Hamas in Gaza (as well as in the West Bank) suggests that Hamas cannot be totally excluded.[26] As argued by Herbert Kelman, excluding Hamas would likely undermine negotiations by "address[ing] the problems of the West Bank at the expense of Gaza."[27] It has also been pointed out that politics and political organisations are not static,[28] and simultaneous efforts by Israel to make negotiations more acceptable to Hamas and by Hamas to become a more acceptable negotiating party to Israel would facilitate Hamas's entrance into the process of "inching towards" a final-status agreement.[29]
^ Baumgarten, H. (2005). The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2005. Journal of Palestine Studies , 34 (4), 25-48, p. 41.
^ Morris, B. (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House Inc, p. 595.
^ Reich, B. (2008). A Brief History of Israel. New York: Checkmark Books, an imprint of Infobase Publishing, p. 297.
^ Morris, B. (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House Inc, p. 578.
^ Reich, B. (2008). A Brief History of Israel. New York: Checkmark Books, an imprint of Infobase Publishing,p. 272.
^ Baumgarten, H. (2005). The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2005. Journal of Palestine Studies, 34 (4), 25-48, p. 42.
^ Lieberman, V. (2009, November 25). Professor of History, University of Michigan.
^ Reich, B. (2008). A Brief History of Israel. New York: Checkmark Books, an imprint of Infobase Publishing,p. 297.
^ Reich, B. (2008). A Brief History of Israel. New York: Checkmark Books, an imprint of Infobase Publishing,p. 271.
^ Reich, B. (2008). A Brief History of Israel. New York: Checkmark Books, an imprint of Infobase Publishing,p. 285.
^ Anonymous. (2009). Prelude to Operation Cast Lead: Israel's Unilateral Disengagement to the Eve of War . Journal of Palestine Studies, 38 (3), 139-168, pp. 159-160.
^ Anonymous. (2009). Prelude to Operation Cast Lead: Israel's Unilateral Disengagement to the Eve of War . Journal of Palestine Studies, 38 (3), 139-168, pp. 162-168.
^ Farquhar, S. C. (2009). Back to basics: a study of the second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press Publication.
^ Farquhar, S. C. (2009). Back to basics: a study of the second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press Publication, p. 67.
^ Anonymous. (2009). Prelude to Operation Cast Lead: Israel's Unilateral Disengagement to the Eve of War . Journal of Palestine Studies, 38 (3), 139-168, p. 168.
^ Farquhar, S. C. (2009). Back to basics: a study of the second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press Publication, p. 34.
^ Pelham, N., & Rodenbeck, M. (2009). Which Way for Hamas? New York Review of Books, 56 (17).
Hamas in Gaza
The relatively recent rise to prominence of the Hamas organisation in the Arab-Israeli conflict has had a marked affect on the social and economic deterioration which characterises the present-day Gaza Conflict. Until 2000, the chief non-state actor against Israel had been the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Following the breakdown of the 1990s Oslo peace accords however, two new organisations - Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza - replaced the PLO as the dominant forces fighting Israel.
The rise of Hamas produced an unprecedented split with Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO. Initially this division was organisational and ideological but later became territorial as well. Indeed, the split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza exceeds anything in the history of Palestinian nationalism and is widely regarded as a continuing threat to the cohesion of the Palestinian movement and prospects of negotiations with Israel.
Hamas: Origins and philosophy
In this way, Hamas reverted to the original 1968 Charter of the PLO, which had also called for Israel’s destruction. However, Hamas departed from PLO secularism in its embrace of militant Islam and unabashed anti-Semitism: “When an enemy usurps a Muslim land, then jihad is an individual religious duty on every Muslim”.[6] Hamas is committed to replacing Israel with a Palestinian Islamic state, all the while refusing to recognise Israel’s right to exist.[7] To many Palestinians, this continues to be far more emotionally appealing than Fatah's interest in negotiations.[8]
Build-up to the Gaza fighting of 2008-2009
In the latter part of 2001 local Hamas militants in Gaza began firing rockets into Israel as part of the second intifada. These activities intensified significantly during 2004 and 2005. When Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza, it was hoped by Israel and others that the removal of settlers and soldiers from the area would reduce the motivation for further attacks. However, the Palestinian Authority (PA), to which control of Gaza was turned over, was even less effective than the Israeli security forces in suppressing rocket fire. It was unclear that the PA, even if it had the ability to do so, had a political interest in cracking down on the Hamas militants, in light of Hamas’s immense popularity among the Palestinians of Gaza.[9]
Hamas saw no reason to halt attacks just because Israel had withdrawn from Gaza. Moreover, Israeli withdrawal was more rhetoric than reality: Israel continued to control all air, sea and land approaches to Gaza, as well as its city and water supplies. Hamas insisted that Israel needed to cede this control if Gaza were to be truly independent, and declared its objective to liberate the whole of Gaza and the West Bank.
2006 Palestinian Elections
The Palestinian parliamentary elections in early 2006 saw the transfer of PA government control from Fatah to Hamas. This had severe consequences for, among other things, the Gazan economy. Upon Hamas’s electoral victory, the Israeli government decided it would not transfer the tax revenues that had been collected from the PA.[10] In addition, the US, UK and Israel demanded Hamas renounce violence and recognise Israel. When Hamas refused these demands, the US, Europe and Israel cut off all funding to the Palestinians and refused to recognise it as a legitimate government.[11]
The cut-off of financial aid to the Palestinians only served to increase Hamas’s bitterness. The West was seen by Hamas members and adherents as seeking to penalise the Palestinians for their legitimate democratic choice. Throughout 2006 and 2007 attacks on Israel by Hamas operatives and those of other Palestinian organisations in Gaza intensified. The sustained barrage of rockets fired from Gaza was justified by Hamas through arguing that Gazan civilians had routinely been the victims of Israeli attacks.
Hamas's takeover of Gaza: 2007
In early 2007, attempts were made to form a Palestinian unity government including members of both Hamas and Fatah. These efforts were aimed at making the government a more acceptable negotiating partner with both Israel and other states, as well as ending the antagonism between Fatah leaders in the West Bank and Hamas leaders in Gaza. Approved by the Palestinian parliament on March 17, 2007, the unity government collapsed in June that year when Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip.[12] At the same time as it governed in Gaza, Hamas refused to recognise the authority of the Fatah in the West Bank, resulting in a bitter divide between two separate Palestinian authorities.
Economic blockade
Violence emanating from Gaza continued to escalate rapidly until mid-January 2008, when Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak discontinued all imports into the Gaza Strip and increased Israeli military activity in the region. This effort to convince Hamas to end its attacks had limited success however, and conditions on the Gaza-Israel border continued to deteriorate as bitterness increased on both sides, making a negotiated settlement seem evermore unlikely. Israel eased its siege of Gaza on Jan 22 2008. However, following Hamas’s destruction of a portion of the fence between the Gaza Strip and Egypt the following day, Israel decided in early February to again tighten economic sanctions and step up military operations in the region.[13]
Gaza Fighting 2008-2009
Assessing the events of 2008-2009: Hamas and conditions in Gaza
Disproportion in raw power meant that the ultimate advantage remained with the conventional army - the IDF. There was little Hamas could do to prevent the Israeli Air Force from engaging in the destruction of Gaza infrastructure. According to Palestinians and rights groups, more than 1400 Gazans were killed in the conflict, while according to Israel this number was 1166. Thirteen Israelis were killed.[19]
The economic blockade against Gaza remains in force, and is today supported by Egypt which, as part of its desire to reduce the influence of Iran in the Mid-East, seeks to put pressure on Hamas to reduce its ties with Iran. The US, Israel and Europe continue to refuse to finance Hamas until it recognises Israel. The economy of Gaza is therefore wrecked. There is little trade going on, and virtually no factories operating. Half of the population depends on food assistance from the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees,[22] and education and healthcare systems are in a state of disintegration.[23]
Hamas and the Peace Process
Opinion as to Hamas's precise role in seeking a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Mid-East remains divided. Michael Herzog, Brigadier General in the IDF, argues that Hamas, as the 'spoiler' in the process, should play no role in negotiations and moves towards a peace settlement.[24] Israel has ruled out Hamas as a legitimate negotiating party, the reasons for which have been declared to include Hamas's refusal to recognise Israel's right to exist, its unwillingness to compromise and its violent, undemocratic methods.[25]
On the other hand, continued widespread Palestinian support for Hamas in Gaza (as well as in the West Bank) suggests that Hamas cannot be totally excluded.[26] As argued by Herbert Kelman, excluding Hamas would likely undermine negotiations by "address[ing] the problems of the West Bank at the expense of Gaza."[27] It has also been pointed out that politics and political organisations are not static,[28] and simultaneous efforts by Israel to make negotiations more acceptable to Hamas and by Hamas to become a more acceptable negotiating party to Israel would facilitate Hamas's entrance into the process of "inching towards" a final-status agreement.[29]